Medical Privacy and Medical Research: Judging the New Federal Regulations by Annas, George J.
Boston University School of Law 
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law 
Faculty Scholarship 
2002 
Medical Privacy and Medical Research: Judging the New Federal 
Regulations 
George J. Annas 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons 
The New England Journal  of  Medicine
216 · N Engl J Med, Vol. 346, No. 3 · January 17, 2002 · www.nejm.org
Legal Issues in Medicine
MEDICAL PRIVACY AND MEDICAL 
RESEARCH — JUDGING THE NEW 
FEDERAL REGULATIONS
GEORGE J. ANNAS, J.D., M.P.H.
MERICANS support both protecting the
privacy of medical records and encouraging
medical research. Thus, it is not surprising
that a move to change practices in these two areas has
generated attention and comment. The new federal
regulations, promulgated under the authority of the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (HIPAA), were adopted to protect the privacy of
medical records. They were not specifically designed to
facilitate or limit medical research.1 Nonetheless, the
regulations have prompted strong objections from the
biotechnology industry and from academic medicine.
The Association of American Medical Colleges and
the Biotechnology Industry Organization have argued
that the regulations will make it more difficult, if not
impossible, to conduct research involving the use of
medical records.2-4 Kulynych and Korn discuss some
of these objections elsewhere in this issue of the Jour-
nal.5 In this article, I summarize the new regulations,
outline the debate over them, and suggest directions
for changes.
The HIPAA regulations and commentary are so
detailed and complex that an entire consulting indus-
try has grown up around them — even though com-
pliance is not required until April 2003. In a report
on research rules that is more than 200 pages long,
the National Bioethics Advisory Commission devoted
only one paragraph to the HIPAA regulations. The
commission concluded that they provide “little fed-
eral guidance for IRBs [institutional review boards]
and investigators regarding the protection of privacy
and confidentiality” and that they do not apply to all
research conducted in the United States.6 Nonethe-
less, the basic concept underlying the regulations is
clear: so-called covered entities (all health plans, health
care “clearinghouses,” and health care providers, in-
cluding all physicians except those who never trans-
mit any health information electronically) must ob-
tain specific, written authorization from a patient to
use or disclose health care information (whether writ-
ten or electronic) that is linked to that patient. Patients
must also be notified about their rights with respect
to their medical information, including the right to
restrict the use and disclosure of such information,
the right to inspect and copy their records, the right
to amend their records, and the right to an audit of
A
any disclosure of their records. In addition, these en-
tities “must make reasonable efforts to limit health
information to the minimum necessary to accom-
plish the intended purpose” when they use, disclose,
or request such information. The new regulations do
not preempt or change any existing rule or state law
that provides greater protection of privacy.1
The new regulations were adopted for three reasons:
to give patients access to and control of their medical
information, to restore trust in the health care system,
and to improve the “efficiency and effectiveness” of
health care delivery by adopting a national framework
for maintaining the privacy of medical information.1
None of these goals are controversial. As the back-
ground to the regulations notes, previously there
were “virtually no federal rules . . . to protect the
privacy of health information and guarantee patient
access to such information. . . . All fifty states to-
day recognize in tort law a common law or statutory
right to privacy.”1 The increasing use of computers
and the Internet has also heightened the public’s
concern that the privacy of medical information is
not being adequately protected.7
A patient’s medical record is seen by an average of
150 people during the course of a hospital stay.8 No
laws specify the people who are allowed to see med-
ical records or the parts of the records they can see.1
Of even more concern, individually identifiable med-
ical information is frequently shared with managed-
care organizations, health insurance companies, life
insurance companies, self-insured employers, pharma-
cies, pharmacy-benefit managers, clinical laboratories,
accrediting organizations, and medical-information
bureaus.1 With many multistate organizations involved
in health care, there is a need for uniform national
standards. The debate is about what those standards
should be.9
RESEARCH RULES
Since the public strongly supports medical research,
it is likely that most people would agree to have their
medical records reviewed by researchers if the re-
searchers did not disclose identifiable information to
anyone else.10,11 Obtaining authorization from patients
to use their medical records for the purpose of re-
search, however, takes time and effort, and many re-
searchers would prefer not to obtain such authori-
zation from each patient. The new regulations also
require authorization in a form that is much more
detailed than that previously required. The main ar-
gument against requiring individual authorization is
that the invasion of privacy by a researcher viewing
medical records is minimal, and in effect, no one (oth-
er than the researcher) will ever know about it any-
way, as long as confidentiality is maintained.
Under current federal regulations (also known as
the “common rule”), research protocols and con-
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sent forms are reviewed by an IRB.6,12 The IRB has
the authority to waive the requirement of informed
consent if it decides that the proposed research in-
volves “no more than minimal risk,” that the waiver
“will not adversely affect the rights and welfare of
subjects,” and that “the research could not practica-
bly be carried out without the waiver.”12 These rules
for waiving the requirement of informed consent ap-
ply to all types of research.
The HIPAA regulations also permit patient au-
thorization to be waived in certain circumstances. A
covered entity, such as a hospital, may give research-
ers access to medical records without IRB review or
authorization by individual patients in two specific
instances: preparing a research protocol (as long as ac-
cess to medical records is needed for its preparation
and no protected medical information is removed
from the site), and performing research that con-
cerns only people who have died.1 In all other cases,
waivers can be obtained only from an IRB or privacy
board (a new entity that is substantially similar in
composition to an IRB but that has authority only
to review “privacy rights and related interests” in the
research setting). The following criteria must be sat-
isfied to grant a waiver:
(A) The use or disclosure of protected health information
involves no more than minimal risk to the individuals;
(B) The . . . waiver will not adversely affect the privacy
rights and welfare of the individuals;
(C) The research could not practicably be conducted
without the . . . waiver;
(D) The research could not practicably be conducted
without access to and use of the protected health in-
formation;
(E) The privacy risks to individuals whose protected
health information is to be used or disclosed are rea-
sonable in relation to the anticipated benefits if any to
the individuals, and the importance of the knowledge
that may reasonably be expected to result from the re-
search;
(F) There is an adequate plan to protect the identifiers
from improper use and disclosure;
(G) There is an adequate plan to destroy the identifiers at
the earliest opportunity. . . ;
(H) There are adequate assurances that protected health
information will not be reused. . . .1
Of course, if information cannot be linked to an
individual patient, disclosure or use of the informa-
tion cannot violate the patient’s privacy. The regula-
tions provide two methods for the “de-identification”
of medical information. The first is for a knowledge-
able statistician to determine that the risk of identify-
ing an individual patient from the information dis-
closed or used is “very small” and to document the
methods and results used to arrive at this conclusion.
The second method is to strip the records of the fol-
lowing identifiers: name, address (although the first
three digits of the ZIP Code may be retained if the
geographic unit contains more than 20,000 people);
telephone and fax numbers; e-mail address; Social Se-
curity, medical-record, health plan, and account num-
bers; certificate, license, vehicle, and medical-device
serial numbers; World Wide Web universal-resource-
locater (URL) and Internet-protocol (IP) numbers;
biometric identifiers (including fingerprints and voice-
prints); full-face photographs; and “any other unique
identifying number, characteristic or code.”1
OBJECTIONS TO THE NEW RULES
Arguing that “the public interest in the discover-
ies and findings of research is as strong as the public
interest in medical privacy,” the Biotechnology Indus-
try Organization has stated that privacy rules should
be crafted “so as not to adversely affect research.”3 In
a letter to the Department of Health and Human
Services, the organization said that its members were
“shocked and deeply disappointed that the proposed
regulation failed at every turn to establish a legal
framework that would serve both objectives.”3 The
organization argued, among other things, that the de-
identification provisions are “unrealistic” and should
be modified and supplemented by a rule that permits
covered entities “to use valid statistical methods for
creating databases that may be treated as de-identi-
fied.”3 Moreover, deleting the 18 specific identifiers,
the organization argued, “would result in medical his-
tory data of questionable completeness, raising seri-
ous doubts about the validity of conclusions drawn
from any research using a de-identified database.”3
The response of the Association of American Med-
ical Colleges to the new regulations has focused on
making them more hospitable for researchers. The as-
sociation recommended that the list of identifiers that
must be removed from medical records be reduced
from 18 to 8 (name, address, telephone number, fax
number, e-mail address, Social Security number, ve-
hicle number, and full-face or profile photograph),
as long as the covered entity did not have “actual
knowledge” that the disclosed information could be
used alone or in combination with other available
information to identify an individual patient.2 With
respect to the other means of ensuring privacy —
the determination that the risk of identification of an
individual patient would be “very small” — the as-
sociation proposed that the covered entity make this
judgment, not a statistician. Finally, the association
asked that an exception to the requirements be made
for health information disclosed to a researcher who
provides written assurance that “the information will
be used only for research purposes and will not be
further disclosed except as required by law” and that
there will be no “attempt to re-identify or contact in-
dividuals who are the subjects of the information.”2
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The Association of American Medical Colleges also
objected to the criteria for an IRB’s waiver of the au-
thorization requirement, arguing that criteria B and
E are contradictory and that these requirements could
not be reconciled by an IRB.2,13 Moreover, there is a
major difference between the requirements for a waiv-
er under the common rule (which applies to all re-
search protocols, not just those involving access to
medical records)12 and the HIPAA regulations. As
Barnes and Krauss have pointed out, the common
rule addresses the “overall welfare and interests” of
research subjects, whereas the HIPAA regulations
“pertain only to research subjects’ privacy interests.”14
New Authorization Requirements for the Release
of Medical Information
Researchers might prefer that their access to med-
ical records be unimpeded so long as they agree not
to disclose identifiable information to others. Easy ac-
cess to medical records might also benefit public health
and law-enforcement officials. Thus, the HIPAA regu-
lations, promulgated at the end of the Clinton ad-
ministration, came as a surprise, at least as they apply
to medical research.15 Even more surprising was the
endorsement of the regulations by the Bush admin-
istration.16 With such bipartisan support, it is likely
that a version of the regulations that is very close to
the current version will take effect in 2003.
The new regulations require that research subjects
sign a form authorizing the use and disclosure of their
private medical information. Theoretically, at least,
subjects have always had to be asked to consent to
the use of their medical information in research. But
such consent is often vague, as are existing IRB rules
for protecting privacy, which require only that “where
appropriate there are adequate provisions to protect
the privacy of subjects and to maintain the confiden-
tiality of data.”6,12 Under the HIPAA regulations, the
required authorization is much more specific. It must
be in writing and must contain at least the following
elements:
(i) A description of the information to be used . . . in
a specific and meaningful fashion;
(ii) The name or other specific identification of the
person(s) . . . authorized to make the requested use or
disclosure;
(iii) The name . . . to whom the covered entity may
make the requested use or disclosure;
(iv) An expiration date or an expiration event. . . ;
(v) A statement of the individual’s right to revoke the
authorization. . . ;
(vi) A statement that the information used or disclosed
pursuant to the authorization may be subject to redisclo-
sure by the recipient and no longer protected by [the
HIPAA];
(vii) Signature of the individual and date.1
Specification of an expiration date or event (“con-
clusion of the research project” might suffice) and the
right to revoke the authorization are the most unusu-
al provisions. Of course, all subjects have the right to
revoke their agreement to participate in research at any
time.12 However, the ability of the subject to set an ex-
piration date or event for the authorization is new. Also
new is the provision under HIPAA that all persons
have a right to obtain access to their medical infor-
mation (a right that may not explicitly be provided un-
der existing laws and that, even if it is, may not apply
to research records).1 Thus, subjects could obtain ac-
cess to research information (such as whether they
were in a placebo group) after revoking authorization,
unless other provisions were explicitly made in the
authorization.
None of the HIPAA provisions for authorization
necessarily impede research, and they can usually be
integrated into the informed-consent form that sub-
jects must sign before participating in research.1 It
should be emphasized, however, that “informed con-
sent is not a form” but a process.6 As I have written
in the context of genetic research, sole reliance on
complex consent forms to protect research subjects
will only add to the bureaucracy and red tape sur-
rounding research without increasing the subjects’
understanding or safeguarding their rights.17
A Broader View
The critics argue that under the HIPAA regula-
tions, IRBs will be less able (or willing) to waive the
requirement for individual consent to perform re-
search involving medical records than they currently
are under the common rule. In my view, this argu-
ment ignores the broader issue of whether such re-
search should be permitted without the requirement
of individual consent. The question is not whether
it takes more time and effort to obtain individual au-
thorization but whether the individual privacy rights
that are being protected by requiring such authori-
zation are important enough to warrant the require-
ment. Only the public can answer this question. If it
turns out that there are virtually no refusals to au-
thorize the use of identifiable medical records in re-
search and that there are no “leaks” of medical in-
formation in research trials, the requirement could
be reconsidered. The HIPAA regulations are based
on the premise that the public does care. This premise
is supported by survey data, cited in the background
to the HIPAA regulations, showing a high level of
public concern about the privacy of medical records.1
Of course, even if no one refuses to participate in a re-
search project involving medical records, people may
still want to be asked for their approval in advance.
Because many researchers do not want to obtain
individual authorization to use or disclose private
The New England Journal of Medicine 
Downloaded from nejm.org at BOSTON UNIVERSITY on November 22, 2021. For personal use only. No other uses without permission. 
 Copyright © 2002 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved. 
LEGAL ISSUES IN MEDICINE
N Engl J Med, Vol. 346, No. 3 · January 17, 2002 · www.nejm.org · 219
medical information, the mechanisms for obtaining
an exception to this requirement — seeking a waiver
from the IRB or privacy board and eliminating iden-
tifiers from medical information — are important.
Both the Biotechnology Industry Organization and
the Association of American Medical Colleges be-
lieve that the rules for eliminating identifiers are too
strict and that the remaining medical information
would be much less useful than information with
more identifiers.3,6 This concern is understandable
— researchers often want to collect as much infor-
mation as they can, since they may not know which
data will ultimately be important.
The HIPAA regulations permit researchers to re-
tain all the identifiers with the patient’s authoriza-
tion. It is only in the absence of such authorization
that 18 specific identifiers must be stripped to pro-
vide legal protection against the charge of a violation
of privacy. To argue that some of these identifiers can
be retained without the patient’s authorization is es-
sentially to argue that it is not necessary to remove
such information in order to protect privacy. The reg-
ulations, however, are based on the opposite premise.
The alternative approach is for an expert to assess the
overall risk of patient identification. The requirement
that an expert in statistics make this assessment has
been criticized, but who else other than such an ex-
pert could realistically and reasonably make it?
In my view, the new provisions for a waiver of the
authorization requirement should be used sparingly,
since the goal of the regulations is to bolster public
trust by protecting privacy, not to make it easier to
perform research involving the use of medical rec-
ords. Nonetheless, the Association of American Med-
ical Colleges and others have raised reasonable ques-
tions in this regard. Specifically, how can criteria B
and E be reconciled — that is, how can the pro-
posed research “not adversely affect the privacy rights
and welfare of the individuals” and at the same time
entail “risks to individuals . . . [that are] reason-
able in relation to the anticipated benefits”? If the
research poses no risks, then criterion E is unneces-
sary, but if the research does pose risks, then crite-
rion B cannot be met. Clarification is required, al-
though deleting either criterion B or criterion E
seems more reasonable than deleting both, as the
Association of American Medical Colleges has sug-
gested.
Criterion G specifies that when the identifying in-
formation is no longer required for the research, it
will be destroyed. This requirement is perfectly rea-
sonable. It also seems reasonable for the IRB (or pri-
vacy board) to establish a specific date or event that
will trigger the requirement, since the subjects will not
be personally involved in the research and are there-
fore unlikely to know when it is finished.
CONCLUSIONS
Although the National Bioethics Advisory Com-
mission did not analyze the new HIPAA regulations
as they relate to research, it made some important
relevant points. First, the commission stated that
“federal policy should be developed and mechanisms
should be provided to enable investigators and insti-
tutions to reduce threats to privacy and breaches of
confidentiality. The feasibility of additional mecha-
nisms should be examined to strengthen confidenti-
ality protections in research studies.”6 Second, noting
that much of the research performed in the United
States today is not subject to the common rule, the
commission recommended that Congress require all
research to be subject to the same rules.6 Finally, the
commission called for reform of the IRB system, in-
cluding the establishment of an independent agency
to oversee IRBs and greater representation of the
public on the boards.6
I believe this reform process must include revisions
of the common rule, including its vague, one-sen-
tence provision regarding privacy. In rewriting the
common rule, it will be important to take into ac-
count the new HIPAA regulations and the reactions
of the research community. Ultimately, it is the fed-
eral research rules, not the HIPAA regulations, that
should provide guidance for IRBs. In the meantime,
efforts should be focused on developing construc-
tive ways to implement the HIPAA regulations (in-
cluding amending them where appropriate) rather
than trying to return to the days when privacy was
not taken seriously in medical research. Public sup-
port of medical research really is a function of public
trust. Providing meaningful protection of the privacy
of medical records in research is an important goal
in its own right and will also increase public trust in
the entire medical-research enterprise.
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